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Abstract 
 
This paper outlines a conceptual framework of the relationship between corporate governance and two 
important  determinants  of  capital  market  development  namely,  a  firm’s  access  to  finance,  and  its 
financial performance. The framework assumes that a firm’s corporate governance is simultaneously 
determined by a group of related governance components and other firm characteristics. Whilst the 
capital markets play a crucial role in enhancing corporate governance standards, the effectiveness and 
credibility of such effort might be constrained by poor firm-level corporate governance. Moreover, the 
cause and effect relationship can work in the opposite direction e.g. firm-level corporate governance 
quality can enhance both the firm’s  ability to gain access to finance  and its financial performance, 
which  eventually  lead  to  capital  market  development.  The  framework  is  primarily  based  on  the 
economic approaches to corporate governance, although it recognises part of the assumptions of the 
stakeholder theory and the political economy aspects of corporate governance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The  capital  market
9  of  a  country  can  exert 
considerable  influence  on  the  firm  by  imposing 
certain  rules  and  regulations  relating  to  the  firm’s 
governance practices. Whilst the legal and regulatory 
structures  are  essential,  the  capital  market,  with 
adequate transparency and accountability in place, can 
ultimately reward or punish firms for their governance 
practices
10 (Drobetz et al. 2004). The capital market 
can wield its governance role in mitigating the agency 
problems  through  disciplining  the  management  and 
improving the firm’s overall governance. Gugler et al. 
(2003) argue that the strength of a country’s external 
capital  market  determines  the  degree  of  a  firm’s 
investment  performance  regardless  of  how  closely 
managers’ and owners’ interests match
11.  
However,  the  corporate  governance  role  of  the 
capital is less likely to be effective in a developing 
economy.  As Iskander and Chamlou (2000) observe, 
the  capital  markets  in  developing  countries  provide 
little incentive for better corporate governance (either 
in the real sector or in the financial sector), primarily 
because of the dominance of a few large firms, low 
trading volumes and liquidity, absence of long-term 
debt  instruments  and  inactivity  of  institutional 
                                                
9 The terms capital market, equity market or stock market 
are used interchangeably in this paper.  
10 Gompers et al. (2003) also make a similar observation. 
11  It  is,  however,  mentioned  that  the  investment 
performance is likely to be constrained by the critical issues 
of transparency and disclosures. 
shareholders.  Moreover,  the  cause  and  effect 
relationship can work in the opposite direction e.g. the 
state  of  country  as  well  as  firm  level  corporate 
governance might have a significant influence on the 
development  of  the  capital  market.  Shleifer  and 
Vishny  (1997)  argue  that  a  firm  is  likely  to  get 
external finance not only because of the reputation of 
the capital market and excessive investor optimism, 
but also due to assurances provided by the corporate 
governance system. 
This  paper  presents a  conceptual  framework  of 
the linkage between corporate governance and capital 
markets. It is based on a review of the theoretical and 
empirical  literature  on  the  influence  of  corporate 
governance on two important issues of capital market 
development: a firm’s access to finance and financial 
performance.  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows: 
section  2  provides  a  conceptual  framework  of  the 
theoretical linkage between corporate governance and 
capital  markets.  Section  3  reviews  the  institutional 
and firm-level corporate governance issues. Section 4 
explains  the  relationship  between  corporate 
governance and the firm’s access to finance. Section 5 
reviews  the  literature  on  corporate  governance  and 
financial  performance.  Finally,  section  6  concludes 
the paper.   
 
2. A Conceptual Framework 
 
This  section  develops  a  conceptual  framework  in 
relation to the influence of corporate governance on a 
firm’s  access  to  finance  and  financial  performance, and  thus  on  capital  market  development.  Figure  1 
shows  that a firm’s corporate  governance  quality  is 
largely dependent on the institutional mechanisms of 
a country including the political economy factors, the 
legal and regulatory standards and the markets. The 
framework however, recognises that the firm’s legal 
compliance as well as voluntary activism in corporate 
governance  matters,  can  reduce  the  expropriation 
costs  in  the  governance  process  and  partly 
compensate  for  the  inefficiency  in  the  institutional 
arrangements in a developing economy
12. 
According  to  the  economic  approaches  to 
corporate  governance
13,  better  firm-level  corporate 
governance not only reduces the agency costs
14, but 
also  enhances  the investors’  optimism  in  the  firm’s 
future cash-flow and growth prospects
15. This in turn, 
reduces the rate of return expected by the investors, 
leading  to  low  cost  of  equity  capital  to  the  firm. 
Likewise, a reduction in the agency costs is likely to 
cause  improved  operating  and  investment 
performance  of  the  better  governed  firms.  The 
reduced  cost  of  equity  and  the  improved  operating 
performance  eventually  enhance  both  the  firm’s 
ability to access equity finance, and the firm value. 
This  eventually  enhances  the  process  of  capital 
market development
16. 
 
3.  Institutional  and  Firm-Level  Issues  of 
Corporate Governance 
 
This  section  discusses  the  relevance  of  the  legal, 
regulatory and other institutions to the development of 
a  corporate  governance  system.  It  also explains  the 
firm-specific issues of corporate governance.  
 
3.1.  Institutional  Issues  of  Corporate 
Governance 
The Legal System  
Whilst firms rely on external finance (e.g. equity or 
debt) in meeting their investment needs, the pattern of 
                                                
12 Klapper and Love (2004), however, argue that better firm 
level  governance  mechanisms  can  improve  the  investors’ 
protection to a certain degree, but firms alone cannot fully 
compensate for the absence of a strong legal system.  
13 See also, Drobetz et al. (2004); LLSV (2002); Gompers et 
al. (2003); Claessens (2003) 
14 Better governance quality reduces the agency costs to the 
external providers of funds in relation to their monitoring 
and  auditing  costs,  and  other  forms  of  controlling 
shareholders’ and insiders’ expropriations. 
15 With better investor protection and lower expropriation 
by  controlling  shareholders,  outsider  investors  intend  to 
invest more or pay higher share prices in the hope that more 
of the firm’s profits would come back to them as interest or 
dividends (LLSV 2002).  
16  Claessens  (2003)  identifies  several  channels,  through 
which corporate governance frameworks affect the growth 
and development of economies, financial markets and firms. 
These  include,  greater  access  to  financing,  lower  cost  of 
capital, better firm performance, reducing risks of financial 
distress and financial crisis, and more favourable treatment 
of all stakeholders. 
relationship between the firm as a distinct legal entity 
and  the  shareholders  or  creditors,  tends  to  be 
determined  by  a  complex  contractual  arrangement, 
which in turn is influenced by the legal system within 
which  the  firm  operates.  The  legal  system  of  a 
country determines the corporate governance structure 
in relation to the rules regarding the ownership and 
board  structures,  mergers  and  liquidations  and 
shareholders’ rights (Gugler et al. 2003; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Similarly, debt contracts help creditors 
to protect and exercise their rights through liquidation 
or bankruptcy process (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
Nevertheless, unlike developed economies, the legal 
protection  of  the  firm’s  external  financiers 
(shareholders  or  creditors)  in  many  developing 
economies  tends  to  be  very  low  because  of  the 
differences in interpretation in the legal systems and 
poor legal enforcement (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
 
The Political Economy Issues 
In response to the economic interests of the different 
stakeholders of a society, the political process creates 
or changes laws, and thus acts as a link between legal 
rules  and  economic  outcomes  (Pagano  and  Volpin 
2005;  Bebchuk  and  Neeman  2005).  Pagano  and 
Volpin (2005) put forward a political economy model 
of corporate governance based on cross-country data 
on political determinants of investor and employment 
protection.  The  model  assumes  that  the  political 
process determines the motives as well as the timing 
of  changes  in  corporate  laws  by  formalising  the 
behaviour  of  voters.  Bebchuk  and  Neeman  (2005) 
propose  a  similar  model  to  analyse  how  political 
interplay  of  the  three  different  interest  groups  (e.g. 
corporate  insiders,  institutional  shareholders  and 
entrepreneurs) affects the level of investor protection 
or private benefits of control. Turnbull (1997) regards 
the political model as a macro framework of political, 
legal  or  regulatory  systems,  within  which  an 
allocation of corporate power, privileges and profits 
(among  owners,  managers  and  other  stakeholders) 
takes place at a micro level. 
 
Markets and Competition 
Aside  from  working  as  a  source  of  financing 
investment (Samuel 1996), a capital market tends to 
have  both  direct  and  indirect  influence  on  the 
governance practices of the listed firms (Singh 2003). 
The  direct  governance  measures  include:  tightening 
listing  requirements,  controlling  insider  dealing 
arrangements,  imposing  disclosure  and  accounting 
rules,  ensuring  protection  of  minority  shareholders 
and  attracting  reputational  agents  (Claessens  2003; 
Singh et al. 2002). Conversely, a capital market can 
exert indirect influence through pricing mechanisms, 
which  include  both  allocative  and  disciplinary 
measures and the takeover mechanisms (Singh 2003; 
Samuel 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Corporate Governance, Access to Finance and Financial Performance: A Conceptual Framework 
 
Tobin (1984), cited in Singh (2003), distinguishes 
between the two concepts of share price efficiency of 
the  stock  market  namely,  information  arbitrage 
efficiency  through  which  all  currently  available 
market  information  is  incorporated  into  the  share 
price,  and  fundamental  valuation  efficiency,  where 
share  prices accurately  reflect  the future  discounted 
earnings of the firm. Singh (2003) also mentions that 
the  stock  market,  with  the  help  of  the  market  for 
corporate  control
17,  can  improve  the  efficiency  and 
performance  of  a  firm  by  replacing  inefficient 
managers  and  transferring  the  firm  assets  to  those 
who can manage it more efficiently.  
                                                
17  The  market  for  corporate  control  includes  hostile 
takeovers,  management  buy-outs,  and  leveraged  buy-outs 
(Prowse 1994).   
However,  several  studies
18  observe  that  the 
effectiveness of the pricing (e.g. both allocative and 
takeover) mechanisms in a developing economy tends 
to  remain  rudimentary  because  of  poor  corporate 
governance  associated  with  transparency  and 
disclosures
19.  Alba  et  al.  (1998)  argue  that  the 
                                                
18  For  example,  Claessens  (2003);  Morck  et  al.  (2000); 
Singh (2003); Demirag and Serter (2003) 
19 Singh (2003) and Prowse (1994) criticise the takeovers 
mechanism  as  being  an  inherently  flawed  and  expensive 
method  of  solving  corporate  governance  problems. 
Claessens (2003) states that, in a capital market with a weak 
property rights environment, insider investors including the 
analysts,  might  be  involved  in  the  trading  of  private 
information available to them before it is disclosed to the 
public.  Iskander  and  Chamlou  (2000)  also  state  that  the 
signalling  measure  is  likely  to  be  diluted  if  the  capital 
market is not transparent, investments are costly to exit and 
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(-) 
(+)  (-) governance  role  of  a  developing  economy  capital 
market  is  being  constrained  by  an  absolute  family 
dominance,  weak  incentives  to  improve  disclosure 
and  governance,  poor  protection  of  minority 
shareholders,  and  weak  accounting  standards  and 
practices.  Demirag  and  Serter  (2003)  also  mention 
that the majority of family-based business groups in 
developing countries appear to own and control banks 
(through pyramidal or complex shareholding) that act 
as a substitute for external capital market. Likewise, 
Prowse (1994) argues that the managers of firms with 
less  reliance  on  external  finance  are  unlikely  to  be 
disciplined by the capital market.  
The institutional investors
20, being an important 
part  of  the  capital  market,  tend  to  influence  the 
process  of  corporate  governance.  For  example, 
Samuel (1996) argues that institutional investors tend 
to  be  more  efficient  than  individual  investors  in 
collecting,  analysing  and  acting  on  objective,  firm-
specific fundamental information, and thus influence 
a firm’s investment and other financial decisions. The 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC), the FRC 
(2003) and Mallin (2004), outline several governance 
roles  of  the  institutional  investors  in  solving  the 
agency  problems,  which  include  (Mallin  2004):  (i) 
engaging in dialogue with the firm based on mutual 
understanding  of  objectives,  (ii)  evaluating  overall 
governance  disclosures  with  particular  emphasis  on 
board structure and composition, (iii) evaluating and 
monitoring  the  performance  relating  to  shareholder 
value and shareholder activism, (iv) exercising voting 
power  (either  direct  or  proxy  voting)  on  all  major 
corporate  decisions,  and  (v)  intervening  whenever 
necessary, particularly in the issues like corporate and 
operational  strategies,  investment  decisions, 
acquisition  or  disposal  strategy,  internal  control 
mechanism, and board and management contracts.  
Increased  institutionalisation  seems  to  improve 
the  efficiency  of the  governance  role  of  the  capital 
market with which the firms are valued and governed. 
Samuel  (1996)  argues  that  the  monitoring  and 
disciplinary  activities  of  institutional  investors  may 
act as a viable alternative to debt finance as well as 
the market for corporate control
21. This is particularly 
                                                                       
institutional  investors  are  poorly  governed.  Others  (e.g. 
Keynes  1936;  Singh  2003)  also  suggest  that  the  pricing 
mechanism  is  often  dominated  by  speculation,  herding, 
myopia and fad, that all weaken the capacity of the stock 
market  to  ensure  the  allocation  of  resources  in  a  more 
efficient  way.  The  real  world  stock  prices  tend  to  be 
simulated by the information arbitrage efficiency, as Keynes 
(1936, cited in Singh 2003) argues that successful investors 
anticipate  the  likely  movements  of  other  stock  market 
participants rather than appreciating the fundamental values 
of the firm. 
20  Such  as,  insurance  companies,  pension  funds,  non-
pension bank trusts and mutual funds 
21 However, Samuel (1996) does not find any evidence of 
the  impact  of  institutional  ownership  on  investment 
performance. Sarker and Sarker (2000), cited in Claessens 
and  Fan  (2002),  also  find  no  evidence  that  institutional 
important for developing country firms, because they 
appear to rely more on debt than equity. However, as 
Iskander  and  Chamlou  (2000)  and  Samuel  (1996) 
argue, institutional investors in developing economies 
generally represent only a small part of a diversified 
portfolio  and  also  may  not  be  strong  enough  to 
impose  fairness,  efficiency,  and  transparency. 
Therefore, the institutional investors are less likely to 
play  a  strong  governance  role  in  a  developing 
economy.  
Stiglitz (1985, cited in Prowse 1994) and Gul and 
Tsui (1998), argue that the debt market can mitigate 
the  agency  problem  by  providing  the  debt  holders 
with the incentives and power to monitor and control 
insiders’  expropriation.  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997) 
also state that the concentration of debt in the hands 
of  few  creditors  tends  to  help  the  latter  exercise 
significant cash flow as well as control rights
22, and 
thus reduce the firm’s agency costs (by preventing the 
managers  from  investing  in  unworthy  investment 
projects  or  extracting  private  benefits).  It  is  further 
commented that creditors can liquidate a firm (if it is 
unable to run efficiently or pay its debts), acquire the 
assets used as collateral, and participate in the voting 
process  on  major  corporate  decisions
23  (e.g. 
reorganisation  of  the  firm  or  removal  of  the 
managers). Nonetheless, irrespective of the nature of 
creditor rights, the effectiveness of the country’s legal 
system seems to remain crucial.  
Friedman (1953, cited in Singh et al., 2002) says 
that perfect competition in product markets solves the 
associated  problems  of  corporate  governance  in 
modern  corporations  including  the  problems  of 
separation  of  ownership  and  control.  Because 
competitive  market  would  ensure  natural  selection 
through which profit maximising firms with optimal 
ownership  patterns  and  corporate  governance 
structures would survive. Gillan (2006) refers to the 
theoretical perspectives on the link between product 
market competition and different aspects of corporate 
governance,  including  compensation  structure  and 
CEO turnover. However, different researchers suggest 
that  competition  alone  can  not  eliminate  the  above 
mentioned  problems.  In  the  real  world  both  capital 
and product markets suffer from fundamental market 
imperfections  and  therefore  it  is  easier  for  larger 
profitable  firm  to  take  over  a  small  profitable  firm 
than the other way around (Singh et al., 2002). It is 
also mentioned that the probability of survival for a 
large  unprofitable  firms  are  relatively  higher  than 
                                                                       
investors are active in corporate governance. 
22 The relative power and domination of creditors are much 
higher for multiple creditors, because each of the individual 
creditors  can  take  legal  action  against  the  firm,  and  it  is 
reasonably difficult for the firm to renegotiate with several 
creditors  rather  than  a  single  one  (Shleifer  and  Vishny 
1997). 
23 Creditors can use short term lending and take the equity 
ownership  of  the  firm  in  order  to  be  involved  in  the 
investment  and  other  corporate  decisions  (Shleifer  and 
Vishny 1997). those  for  a  smaller,  relatively  profitable  firm. 
Likewise, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Kar (2000) 
argue that product market competition is probably the 
most powerful force towards economic efficiency in 
the  world  but  this  doesn’t  deny  the  place  for  the 
mechanisms for corporate governance. 
Available literature also refers to the influence of 
the labour markets (for the board members, CEOs and 
others executives) on the firm’s corporate governance. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that labour market 
forces  and  reputation  concerns  have  a  disciplining 
effect on both managers and board members. Gillan 
(2006)  also  mentions  that  the  governance  and 
organisational  structure  are  associated  with  the 
employment  relationship  and  the  labor  market  for 
executives.  
The reputational agents
24 can play important roles 
in  enhancing  better  corporate  governance.  Iskander 
and  Chamlou  (2000)  mention  that  the  reputational 
agents  can  exert  pressure  on  companies  as  well  as 
government to disclose relevant information, improve 
human capital, recognise the interests of the outsiders, 
and otherwise behave as good corporate citizens.            
 
3.2. Firm-level Corporate Governance 
Issues 
 
This  sub-section  explains  the  components  of  firm 
level corporate governance, which include structure of 
ownership and control, shareholder rights, board and 
management diversity, disclosures and auditing, and 
responsibility towards the stakeholders. 
 
Structure of Ownership and Control  
The structure of ownership defines the nature of the 
principal-agent problems, e.g. the extent to which a 
manager’s goals are closely aligned with those of the 
owners of a firm (Gugler et al. 2001; Claessens 2003). 
The agency problems can be mitigated through large 
or  concentrated  shareholding,  because  this  gives 
investors  the  incentives  and  abilities  to  acquire 
information on the firm’s operations and to monitor 
and control opportunistic behaviour of the manager at 
the  expense  of  the  firm’s  long  term  value  creation 
activities (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Claessens 2003). 
The ownership of a firm can be concentrated in the 
hands  of  different  shareholders  such  as,  family, 
individual or a group of individuals, foreign investors 
or  institutions  like  banks,  non-bank  financial 
institutions,  non-financial  institutions,  and  the  state 
(Shleifer  and  Vishny  1997).  The  types  of 
shareholding  tend  to  have  different  governance 
implications
25, since different controlling shareholders 
                                                
24 Among others, the reputational agents include, accounting 
and auditing professionals, lawyers, investment bankers and 
analysts,  credit  rating  agencies,  consumer  activists, 
environmentalists,  and  the  media  in  monitoring  the 
performance  of  the  firms  in  the  process  of  corporate 
governance.  
25  Nonetheless,  a  country’s  legal  structures  tend  to 
determine  the  power  and  scope  of  the  governance  role 
might possess different incentives, skills and abilities 
to  monitor  the  activities  of  management  and  board 
(Prowse 1994). For example, management ownership 
is a popular device to reduce the agency costs since 
managers,  as  owners,  are  likely  to  act  in  the  best 
interest of the firm (Tsui and Gul 2000).  
 
Shareholder Rights and Equitable 
Treatment 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) mention that shareholders 
can exercise their basic rights by being involved in the 
voting  process  of  a  firm,  especially  on  several 
important corporate decisions such as, election of the 
board  of  directors,  and  mergers  and  liquidations. 
However, the inefficiency in the legal system in many 
developing economies seems to cause the poor state 
of  minority  shareholder  rights  in  relation  to  their 
participation in the governance process or receiving 
dividends. The presence of multiple classes of shares 
also causes discriminatory practices among different 
types  of  shareholders  (e.g.  some  shareholders  can 
exercise more voting rights than their cash-flow rights 
in  the  firm)  (Claessens  et  al.  2000).  Moreover,  the 
opportunistic  behaviour  of  the  controlling  board, 
coupled with the informational asymmetries between 
managers  and  minority  shareholders,  makes  it 
difficult for the latter to exercise their rights (Caprio 
and  Levine  2002).  In  spite  of  the  possibility  that  a 
large  group  of  small  shareholders  can  concentrate 
their voting rights, it does not seem to be financially 
and  practically  feasible  because  of  the  free  rider 
problem,  where  most  individual  shareholders  are 
small  and  dispersed  and  are  unlikely  to  have  the 
motivation  to  organise  themselves  (Shleifer  and 
Vishny 1997). In this connection, the OECD (2004) 
mention that a well-structured corporate governance 
framework and the codes of good governance might 
help  in  protecting  shareholder  rights  and  ensuring 
equitable treatment.   
 
Board and Management Diversity 
The board of directors and executive management are 
two  important  components  of  a  firm’s  governance 
process. Several closely related governance issues of 
the board and management include the responsibility, 
structure  and  independence  of  the  board,  and  the 
management contract.  
The  board  seems  to  be  an  important  internal 
mechanism for resolving the agency problems, since 
it  is  primarily  responsible  for  recruiting  and 
monitoring the executive management to protect the 
interests  of the shareholders and  other stakeholders. 
Mallin (2004) mentions that the board makes a bridge 
between  managers  and  investors  by  taking  a 
leadership  role
26.  Mallin  also  suggests  that  an 
                                                                       
played by different types of shareholders. 
26 Available literature (e.g. Mallin 2004, McColgan 2001; 
Solomon et al. 2003) also emphasises the presence of board 
sub-committees  such  as  remuneration  committee,  audit evaluation of the board (or board sub-committees) can 
help establish performance criteria that can be used to 
achieve  the  corporate  objective  and  to  align  the 
performance of the directors with the interest of the 
shareholders. A related literature also refers to board 
structure and independence as important governance 
components.  Denis  and  McConnell  (2003)  regard  a 
smaller  board  as  an  important  determinant  of 
corporate governance and firm performance. Solomon 
et al. (2003) and Tsui and Gul (2000) opine that the 
outside or non-executive directors play an important 
governance  role  in  relation  to  the  welfare  of  the 
investors,  especially  non-controlling  shareholders. 
The presence of outside directors improves the degree 
of corporate accountability and creates a balance of 
power between the CEO and the board
27 (Denis and 
McConnell  2003;  Ricart et  al. 1999). Likewise, the 
OECD  (2003)  observes  that  independent  non-
executive directors can exercise impartial judgement 
in relation to the conflicts of interest among different 
stakeholders.  This  presence  of  independent  non-
executive  directors  seems  to  have  an  important 
implication in family-based governance, as Solomon 
et al. (2003) consider founding family dominance as a 
negative aspect of corporate governance
28.  
The issue  of CEO duality (the CEO and board 
chairperson  being  the  same  individual)  appears  to 
constrain  board  independence,  because  there  is  a 
possibility of conflict of interests. Daily and Dalton 
(1997)  and  Kesner  and  Dalton  (1986)  mention  that 
separate  board  structure  can  enhance  board 
independence  and  shareholder  value.  However,  a 
separate  board  does  not  necessarily  ensure  better 
governance,  as  Daily  and  Dalton  (1997)  argue,  the 
chairperson  in  a  separate  board  structure  might 
possess  his/her  own  interest  in  the  firm’s 
governance
29.  Corporate  interlocking
30  is  another 
inter-organisational  strategy  for  managing  the 
resource  interdependencies  such  as,  strategic 
alliances, mergers and acquisitions (Ong et al. 2003). 
Whilst  the  presence  of  the  same  individual  on  the 
boards of several firms can create firm value, it can 
yield a negative influence on the firm’s governance 
                                                                       
committee,  nomination  committee  and  risk  committee,  to 
oversee  specific  governance  matters  and  to  maintain 
transparency and accountability. 
27  Ricart  et  al.  (1999),  however,  suggest  that  the  quality 
rather  than  the  quantity  of  non-executive  directors  is 
important for effective corporate governance. 
28 A non-executive director is said to be independent in his 
judgement,  and  is  not  at  all  influenced  by  any  financial, 
family  or  other  form  of  tie,  with  the  company  or  its 
management (Mallin 2004). 
29 For example, the chairperson might be a firm’s former 
CEO,  or  holds  large  shares  of  the  firm  or  have  a  close 
relationship  with  the  founding  family  or  executive 
management. 
30  Ong  et  al.  (2003)  define  board  interlocking  in  two 
different ways: (i) the total number of firms in which the 
directors of a firm sit as the board members, and (ii) the 
number of total directorships held by the directors of a firm. 
because  of  the  potential  for  conflicts  of  interests 
between firms. Aside from monitoring the executive 
management,  the  board  is  also  responsible  for 
designing the management contract that minimises the 
degree  of  agency  conflicts.  Several  studies  (e.g. 
Prowse  1994;  Becht  et  al.  2002;  McColgan  2001) 
mention that a management contract aligns personal 
interest of the managers with that of the shareholders 
and  provides  managers  with  the  incentives  to 
maximise  firm  value.  It  is  suggested  that  a  value-
enhancing management contract should include: basic 
salary components, performance-based cash bonuses 
and profit-based salary revisions, stock participation 
plan
31 (e.g. stock options), outright ownership of the 
firm’s  equity,  pension  rights,  performance-based 
dismissal provisions, and long-term incentive plans.     
 
Transparency and Accountability   
Transparency  and  accountability
32  are  two  closely 
related issues that are crucial, not only in enhancing 
the disclosure and auditing standards  of a firm,  but 
also in developing the regulatory organ’s capacity to 
monitor  and  discipline  the  firm’s  governance 
practices.  Therefore,  it  is  imperative  for  a  firm  to 
make  its  financial  and  non-financial  information 
available and easily  accessible to outsiders in  order 
that everyone can make informed decisions. Effective 
disclosures  enable  existing  as  well  as  prospective 
investors,  to  evaluate  the  management’s  past 
performance,  forecast  the  firm’s  future  cash  flow 
(Gilson 2000), and to decide whether the risk profile 
of a firm is within an acceptable level (Fok 2000). As 
Mallin  (2002:253)  notes,  “…  information  to 
shareholders is one of the most important aspects of 
corporate  governance,  as  it  reflects  the  degree  of 
transparency  and  accountability  of  the  corporations 
towards  its  shareholders”.  The  quality  of  a  firm’s 
disclosures  tends  to  be  determined  by  the 
development of the capital market and the standards 
of  accounting  and  auditing  practices  of  a  country. 
Whilst  Claessens  and  Fan  (2002)  emphasise  the 
quality  auditing  and  professional  integrity  of  the 
external  auditors,  it  is  commented  that  weak 
enforcement  of  accounting  and  auditing  standards 
restrains quality auditing.  
 
Responsibility towards the Stakeholders 
As  mentioned  earlier,  an  effective  corporate 
governance  system  enhances  corporate  transparency 
and accountability, and maintains a balance between 
the shareholders’ wealth maximisation and the diverse 
interests of various stakeholders. Kar (2000) observes 
that a fundamental objective of corporate governance 
                                                
31  McColgan  (2001)  regards  the  use  of  an  equity-based 
management compensation plan as an effective measure to 
mitigate agency problems and maximise shareholder value. 
32  Transparency  can  be  defined  as  a  process  by  which 
information about existing conditions, decisions and actions 
is  made  accessible,  visible  and  understandable,  whereas 
accountability refers to the discipline and need to justify and 
accept responsibility for the decisions taken (Sheng 2000). is  the  enhancement  of  shareholder  value,  whilst 
protecting the interests of other stakeholders. Mallin 
(2004)  suggests  that  a  preferential  treatment  to  the 
shareholders
33, whilst taking into account the interests 
of the stakeholders, can enhance both shareholder and 
stakeholder  values.  The  OECD  (2004)  outlines 
several  principles  of  corporate  governance  that 
acknowledge the roles and rights of the stakeholders, 
such as the employees and society as a whole. It is 
stated that the stakeholders’ rights as established by 
the  legal  system  of  the  country  (or  through  mutual 
agreements and co-operation), need to be recognised 
by  a  firm  for  maximising  the  well-being  of  its 
employees,  creating wealth  and  welfare  for  society, 
and maintaining sustainability of the enterprises and 
financial  systems.  This  section  has  reviewed  the 
concept of corporate governance from the perspective 
of  institutional  and  firm-level  components.  The 
effectiveness  of  corporate  governance  mechanisms 
tends  to  be  dependent  on  the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework  of  a  country,  variations  in  the  market 
practices and regulation of the stock exchanges, and 
differing societal values. An appropriate governance 
framework  requires  an  optimal  mix  of  these 
mechanisms  that  in  turn,  can  resolve  corporate 
governance  problems.  However,  as  several  studies 
(e.g. Prowse 1994; Tsui and Gul 2000; Cuervo 2002) 
suggest,  the  effectiveness  of  this  optimal  mix  may 
vary depending on the institutional development of a 
country,  its  corporate  governance  system  and  the 
company in question. 
 
4.  Corporate  Governance  and  Access  to 
Finance 
 
A related literature (LLSV 1997, 1998; Gilson 2000; 
Claessens 2003) observes that corporate governance 
influences the firm’s access  to external finance and 
capital  market  development  through  controlling  the 
insiders’  and/or  controlling  shareholders’ 
expropriation,  and  thus  enhancing  the  investors’ 
confidence
34.  The  firm’s  access  to  external  finance 
seems to be influenced, among others, by the cost of 
capital
35 to a firm and the firm’s financing (or capital 
structure)  decisions.  In  this  connection,  this  section 
reviews how corporate governance is linked with the 
firm’s cost of equity capital and its financing pattern. 
                                                
33 It is argued that shareholders, being the recipients of a 
firm’s  residual  cash-flow,  have  a  vested  interest  in  the 
proper utilisation of the firm’s resources. 
34  LLSV  find  the  quality  of  investors’  legal  protection 
having significant positive effect on the valuation as well as 
breadth of both debt and equity markets. Claessens (2003) 
also considers shareholder and creditor rights important in 
developing the capital markets and the banking sector. 
35 For example, as Pal (2001) suggests, increased cost of 
capital, lack of investors’ confidence and favourable bank 
lending rates tend to encourage firms to move away from 
costly equity finance to alternative cheaper sources, which 
ultimately  lead  to  a  decline  in  the  activities  of  capital 
market. 
4.1. Corporate Governance and Cost of 
Equity Capital 
 
In a fully integrated world of capital market with no 
transaction or agency costs, the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model
36  (CAPM)  predicts  that  the  cost  of  equity 
capital (or the investors’ expected return on equity) 
only depends on the level of covariance risks of the 
world market portfolio, and that the country as well as 
firm-specific corporate governance differences, have 
no explanatory power (Drobetz et al. 2004). However, 
a recent literature suggests that corporate governance 
influences the cost of capital because of the potential 
for the principal-agent problems i.e. the agency costs. 
As  Drobetz  et  al.  (2004)  argue,  apart  from  the 
systematic  risks  embedded  in  the  beta
37,  corporate 
governance  could  be  treated  as  an  additional  risk 
factor  for  which  investors  require  an  adequate 
compensation in terms  of higher expected returns
38. 
Therefore,  the  classical  CAPM  approach  should  be 
combined with the firm-specific corporate governance 
issues.  Gugler  et  al.  (2003)  also  mention  that  the 
effectiveness of the capital market in influencing the 
rate of return is more likely to be constrained by the 
critical issue of transparency and disclosures. 
The summary of the empirical studies shown in 
Table  1  reveals  that  better  corporate  governance 
quality reduces a firm’s cost of equity capital, which 
in turn enhances the firm’s access to equity finance. 
Claessens (2003) and LLSV (2000) also support the 
prediction of the agency theory that better corporate 
governance helps firms to reduce their cost of equity 
capital. This is probably because outsiders are likely 
to  provide  more  finance  and  expect  lower  rates  of 
return  if  they  are  given  greater  assurance  (through 
better  governance)  of  a  return  on  their  investment. 
Gompers  et  al.  (2003)  observe  that  poor  corporate 
governance provisions cause agency costs to the firms 
in the form of inefficient investment and other capital 
expenditure decisions. Singh (2003) also argues that 
more efficient and dynamic firms can obtain capital 
from the stock market at a lower cost, whereas firms 
with  less  efficiency  and  dynamism  have  to  acquire 
capital at a higher cost. 
                                                
36  The  Capital  Assets  Pricing  Model  (CAPM)  determines 
the required rate of return of a firm or a project as the sum 
of the risk free rate of interest and the market risk premium. 
The market risk premium is calculated by multiplying the 
difference between the market return and the risk free rate 
of interest with the Beta of the project. Beta is the measure 
of the extent of systematic risk in the project e.g. the higher 
the beta (or systematic risks) the greater the required rate 
return (or cost of capital) (Parasuraman 2002). 
37 See, the CAPM approach above. 
38 Lombardo and Pagano (2002) and Drobetz et al. (2004) 
argue that expected stock returns compensate investors for 
their  expected  monitoring  and  auditing  costs,  and  other 
forms  of  expropriations  associated  with  the  firm’s 
governance process. Table 1. Summary of the literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and cost of equity 
capital 
Author(s)  Sample (Period)  Focus of the Study  Key Findings 
Black et al. 
(2006) 
515 Korean firms (2001)   CG and firm value  * Better governed firms tend to enjoy lower cost of capital  
Drobetz et al. 
(2004) 
91 German firms (2002)  CG and stock returns  * CG is negatively related with the expected stock returns 
Lombardo and 
Pagano (2002) 
1,183 firms, 21 developed 
economies (1997)  
Legal determinants of 
the return on equity 
* Shareholder rights is negatively associated cost of equity 
capital 
* Accounting standards are positively linked with excess returns  
Ashbaugh et al. 
(2004) 
995 non-fin S&P 1500 
firms (1996-02) 
CG and cost of equity 
capital (COE) 
* Firms with better CG have lower COE 
* Firms with more transparency and more independent audit 
committee have lower COE 
* Ownership concentration is positively linked with COE 
* Board independence and % of board that own stock are 
negatively linked with COE  
Chen et al. (2003)  545 firm-yr obs., 9 Asian 
economies (2000-01) 
CG and cost of equity 
capital (COE) 
* Disclosure and non-disclosure CG have negative effect on COE 
* Strengthening overall CG is more important than adopting 
better disclosure policy  
Source: Compiled by the authors based on a review of the literature 
 
Table 2. Summary of the literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and capital structure 
Author(s)  Sample (Period)  Focus of the Study  Key Findings 
Wen et al. (2002)  60 Chinese firms (1996-
98) 
CG and capital 
structure  
* CEO tenure and outside directors are negatively linked with 
leverage 
* No evidence on the effect of board size and CEO compensation 
on debt ratio 
Suto (2003)  375 non-fin Malaysian 
firms (1995-99) 
CG and investment 
behaviour 
* Ownership concentration (OC) and firm size (FS) are negatively 
linked with the debt ratio 
Du and Dai 
(2005) 
1,473-1,484 East Asian 
firms (1994-96) 
Ownership and 
capital structure 
* Controlling owners with little shareholding choose higher debt 
* Weak CG and crony capitalism contributes to risky capital 
structure 
Kumar (2005)  2,000 Indian firms (1994-
00) 
CG and firm 
financing 
* Firms’ with dispersed shareholding have higher leverage 
* Firms’ with higher FS and lower institutional shareholding have 
lower debt 
* No relationship between directors shareholding and debt 
Jiraporn and 
Gleason (2005) 
4,638 firm-yr obs. from 
IRRC (non-fin) (1993-02)  
Shareholder rights 
and capital 
structure 
* Firms with more restricted shareholder rights have higher 
leverage 
* Supports the view that leverage helps alleviate agency problems  
Alba et al. 
(1998) 
357 Thai firms  (1994-97)  Corporate fin. and 
CG  
* OC is positively linked with leverage 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on a review of the literature 
 
4.2. Corporate Governance and Firm Financing 
 
The  seminal  works  of  Fama  and  Miller  (1972)  and  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  are  widely  credited  with 
forwarding the agency theory-based explanation of capital structure. The definition of corporate governance also 
relates corporate governance with the firm’s financing pattern
39. Available literature suggests that debt finance 
can  resolve  agency  problems  through  increased  management  shareholding,  reduced  cash-flow  problems  and 
increased probability of bankruptcy risks and job losses
40. 
 
Several studies empirically examine how capital structure is associated with individual governance issues such as 
ownership and board structures or shareholder rights. The summary of literature presented in Table 2 shows that 
firms with higher ownership concentration or weak shareholder rights tend to have a higher level of debt finance 
(Alba et al. 1998; Jiraporn and Gleason 2005). The literature (e.g. Suto 2003; Du and Dai 2005) also suggests that 
the controlling shareholders’ fear of diluting the shareholding dominance, along with their close links with (or 
increased reliance on) the banks, causes firms to have risky capital structure (e.g. higher leverage).  
 
                                                
39 Shleifer and Vishny (1997:737) define corporate governance “as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves in getting a return on their investment”.   
40 Increased debt finance and subsequent higher management shareholding appear to mitigate agency conflicts by aligning the 
interests of the shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976); the obligation of paying debt along with its interest 
reduces free cash flow and thus restrains managers from using the free cash for non-optimal activities (Jensen 1986); debt 
finance increases the probability of costly bankruptcy and subsequent job losses, and thus encourages managers to work 
harder, consume fewer perquisites, and make better investment decisions (Grossman and Hart 1982, cited in Harris and Raviv 
1991).      Table 3. Summary of the literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and financial 
performance 
Author(s)  Sample (Period)  Focus of the Study  Key Findings 
Black et al. (2006)  515 firms,  Korea 
(2001)  
CG and firm value  * CG has a positive influence on firm value 
* Better CG is less likely to predict higher firm profitability 
Drobetz et al. 
(2004) 
91firms, Germany 
(2002) 
CG and expected 
stock returns 
* CG is positively associated with firm value and stock returns 
  
Klapper and Love 
(2004) 
374 firms, 14 
emerging econ. 
(2000) 
Determinants of CG 
and performance 
* Better CG is highly correlated with better profitability and firm 
valuation  
Gompers et al. 
(2003) 
1,500 large firms 
(S&P) (1990s) 
CG and equity prices  * Firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher firm value, 
higher profits and higher sales growth 
Thompson and 
Hung (2002) 
83 firms, Singapore 
(2001) 
CG and corporate 
performance 
* Positive relationship between ownership concentration (OC) and 
profitability 
* Both CGI and non-executive chairman are negatively associated 
with profitability 
Gugler et al. (2003)  19,010 non-fin S&P 
firms (1996-01) 
CG and investment 
returns 
* Firms in countries with strong CG systems, strong accounting 
standards and strong enforcement have higher returns on 
investments  
Gugler et al. (2001)  19,000 firms, 
61economies (1996-
01) 
CG and investment 
returns 
* Managers’ shareholding and cross-shareholding are negatively 
linked with investment performance 
LLSV (2002)  539 large firm, 27 
wealthy economies 
Investor Protection 
and Valuation 
* Firms in countries with better minority shareholder protection, 
and firms with higher cash-flow rights by controlling owners have 
higher value  
Yurtoglu (2000)  126 Turkish non-fin 
firms (1998) 
Ownership, control 
and performance 
* OC and pyramidal shareholding (PS) are negatively linked with 
profitability and firm value  
Lemmon and Lins 
(2003) 
800 non-fin firms, 
East-Asian (1997) 
CG and firm value  * Firms with higher managerial control (MC) and PS have lower 
stock returns 
 
Mitton (2002)  398 East Asian firms 
(1997-98) 
CG and performance  * Disclosure quality and outside OC are positively linked with 
stock returns 
Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002) 
334 firms in Japan 
(1986-91) 
Ownership  and 
profitability 
* Positive association between OC and profitability 
Hovey et al. (2003)  100 firms, China 
(1997-99) 
Valuation and 
ownership 
* No relationship between OC and firm value 
* Institutional shareholding is positively linked with firm value 
Alba et al. (1998)  357 firms, Thailand 
(1994-97) 
Corporate financing 
and CG structure 
* Firms with higher OC have lower profitability 
 
Claessens (1997)  287-1,198 Czech and 
Slovak firms (1992-
93)  
CG and equity prices  * OC and domestic shareholding is positively related with firm 
value 
* Bank-sponsored investment funds is not related with prices 
Farrer and Ramsay 
(1998) 
180 firms, Australian 
(1995) 
Directors’ ownership 
and performance 
* Positive link between directors’ shareholding (DS) and 
performance, although to some extent, inconclusive 
Morck et al. (1988)  370 firms, Fortune500 
(1980) 
Management 
ownership and firm 
value  
* Non-monatomic relationship between firm value and DS  
* Family managed older firms have lower value than outsider 
managed firms 
Bøhren and 
Ødegaard (2003) 
1,057 firms in 
Norway (1989-97)  
CG and performance  * Insider ownership (IO) improves valuation unless the stake is 
unusually big 
* Direct (individual) own. is better than indirect (or institutional) 
ownership 
* OC, dual-class shares and board size (BS) are negatively liked 
with firm value 
Agarwal and 
Knoeber (1996) 
Forbes 800 firms 
(1987) 
Performance and 
control 
* Presence of non-executive directors is negatively linked with 
firm value 
* Relationship between IO and firm value is inconclusive 
Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003)  
348 firms, Australia 
(1996) 
Board comp. and 
Performance 
* BS and non-executive directors are positively related with firm 
value 
 
Ong et al. (2003)   295 firms, Singapore 
(1997) 
Board interlocks  * BS and profitability are positively linked with board interlocks 
Craven and 
Marston (1997) 
325 top UK firms  Investor relations and 
CG 
* Investor relations activities are positively linked with non-
executive chairman, but not related with non-executive directors 
Brickley et al. 
(1997) 
737 large US firms 
(1988) 
Separation of CEO 
and Chairman  
* No evidence that CEO duality has inferior performance   
* Cost of dual leadership is higher in large firms 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on a review of the literature 
 
The  literature  on  the  association  between 
corporate  governance  and  the  firm’s  equity  finance 
appears  to  be  limited.  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997) 
argue  that the  presence  of  large investors  (such  as, 
family  or  banks)  might  have  a  negative  effect  on 
equity  financing  because  of  the  possibility  of 
expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights, which 
prevents  the  latter  from  investing  in  the  capital 
market. Gugler et al. (2003) and Gilson (2000) also 
argue that good governance practices associated with 
better accounting standards and credible disclosures, 
seem to influence higher equity investment, regardless of  a  country’s  legal  institutions
41.  Overall,  the 
evidence  suggests  that  firms  with  poor  governance 
quality are inclined to have a higher level of financial 
leverage. 
This section considered the influence of corporate 
governance  on  the  cost  of  equity  capital  and  the 
financing pattern of a firm. The next section reviews 
available  literature  on  the  relationship  between 
corporate governance and financial performance.   
 
5. Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance 
 
There seems to be a growing disagreement amongst 
researchers  on  whether  corporate  governance 
components should be analysed together rather than 
separately. Whilst a majority of corporate governance 
literature  centres  on  individual  governance 
components, a recent literature is based on corporate 
governance  index  or  rating,  considering  all  related 
issues of corporate governance. Table 3 summarises 
the empirical studies  on  how individual governance 
components  (e.g.  ownership  structures,  shareholder 
rights,  board  and  management  diversity  and 
disclosure quality) and overall governance standards 
(e.g. corporate governance index) are associated with 
the firm’s valuation as well as operating performance. 
The table  shows that the empirical evidence of 
the  influence  of  individual  corporate  governance 
mechanisms
42  on  financial  performance  is  highly 
inconclusive
43.  Whilst  several  studies  (for  example, 
LLSV  2002)  find  a  positive  relationship  between 
ownership  concentration  and  financial  performance, 
and thus support the prediction of the agency theory, 
others  (e.g.  Hovey  et al.  2003)  find  inconsistent  or 
contrasting  evidence  in  this  regard.  Among  others, 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2003) support the notion of the 
agency  theory  with  respect  to  the  negative 
relationship  between  outside  (e.g.  institutional, 
foreign  or  state)  ownership  concentration  and  firm 
performance.  However,  Mitton  (2002)  finds 
institutional  and  outside  ownership  concentration 
being  positively  associated  with  financial 
                                                
41  Gugler  et  al.  (2003),  however,  acknowledge  that  the 
existence  of  strong  accounting  standards  alone  is  not 
sufficient  to  produce  a  strong  external  capital  market  for 
equity.  
42  Available  literature  (e.g.  Klapper  and  Love  2004; 
McGuire  2000;  Thompson  and  Hung  2002;  Craven  and 
Marston 1997; Kiel and Nicholson 2003; Cremers and Nair 
2003) also suggests that corporate governance is influenced 
by  several  firm-specific  characteristics  including,  growth 
opportunities, intangibility of assets, firm size, profitability 
and capital structure pattern. 
43  In  response  to  these  inconclusive  findings,  Farrer  and 
Ramsay (1998) argue that the empirical evidence appears to 
be varied depending on the performance measures used, the 
firm size, the type of industry in which the firm operates, 
whether  directors  are  executive  or  non-executive,  or 
whether  director  share  ownership  is  measured  in  dollar 
value  or  as  a  percentage  of  the  firm’s  total  outstanding 
shares. 
performance. Also, the influence of family as well as 
board  and  management  ownership  on  firm 
performance  tends  to  be  indecisive  (Morck,  et  al. 
1988). 
The  table  also  shows  that  that  the  empirical 
relationships  between  different  board  and 
management issues (e.g. board size, board interlocks 
and  CEO  duality)  and  financial  performance  are 
largely inconsistent
44. A related literature (e.g. LLSV 
2002; Gugler et al. 2003) supports the prediction of 
the agency theory in relation to the positive influence 
of  investors’  legal  protection  on  financial 
performance.  Mitton  (2002)  also  finds  disclosure 
quality  having  a  positive  influence  on  firm 
performance.    
A growing body  of recent literature
45 combines 
all  related  corporate  governance  components  (e.g. 
corporate governance index or rating) to investigate a 
firm’s  overall  governance  quality.  These  studies 
support the prediction of the agency theory in relation 
to  the  positive  influence  of  corporate  governance 
quality  on  valuation  as  well  as  profitability  of  the 
firm.  Claessens  (2003)  argues  that  better  corporate 
governance  can  enhance  firm  value  as  well  as 
operational  performance,  through  more  efficient 
management,  better  allocation  of  assets,  better 
stakeholder  management  and  other  improved 
mechanisms. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The  paper  outlined  a  conceptual  framework  of  the 
relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  two 
important determinants of capital market development 
namely, a firm’s access to finance, and its financial 
performance.  Although  the  capital  market  plays  a 
crucial  role  in  enhancing  corporate  governance 
standards, it was revealed that the effectiveness and 
credibility of such effort might be constrained by poor 
firm-level corporate governance.  
The framework is based on the assumption that a 
firm’s  corporate  governance  is  simultaneously 
determined  by  a  group  of  related  governance 
components and other firm characteristics. Therefore, 
all  of  these  factors  need  to  be  considered  together 
(rather than taking a single component like ownership 
or board) to capture a holistic picture. 
Whilst the framework is primarily based on the 
economic  approaches  to  corporate  governance  (e.g. 
the  agency  theory  and  the  internal  governance 
structures),  it  recognises part  of  the  assumptions  of 
the  stakeholder  theory  in  relation  to  a  firm’s 
responsibility towards the stakeholders. Moreover, the 
political  economy  model’s  assumption  of  the 
influence of the political interplay of powerful interest 
                                                
44  See  Kiel  and  Nicholson  (2003); Bøhren  and  Ødegaard 
(2003); Craven and Marston (1997); Thompson and Hung 
(2002) 
45 For example, Gompers et al. (2003); Black et al. (2006); 
Drobetz et al. (2004); Klapper and Love (2004) groups is acknowledged. Altogether, it was explained 
that  firm-level  corporate  governance  quality  can 
enhance  both  the  firm’s  ability  to  gain  access  to 
finance  and  its  financial  performance,  which 
eventually lead to capital market development. 
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